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E. Donald Elliott-Yale Law School; Paul,Hastings,Janofsky &
Walker
David Mdntosh-Member, United States House of
Representatives
Michael Rappaport-Universityof San Diego School of Law
INTRODUCTION BY MR. GRIFFITH

Our topic is:
I welcome you to our panel discussion.
Disciplining Congress: The Taxing and Spending Powers. Our
panel will address a topic that goes to the heart of a debate over
the nature of humankind: When dealing with governmentour
elected
can
of wealth,
redistribution
sponsored
representatives, to whom the Constitution grants federal taxing
and spending authority, be trusted to exercise that authority; or
must we place upon them what James Madison referred to as
"auxiliary precautions,"1 burdens higher than those imposed by
the requirement that they stand for reelection, in the case of the
House, every two years, or in the case of the Senate, every six years?
The 104th Congress saw a number of proposals born of a
distrust of our elected representatives and a suspicion that when
the issue is redistribution of wealth, the temptation is simply too
great to allow the accountability that comes from standing for
reelection to provide a sufficient check or incentive to control
1

THE FEDERAUST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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their behavior. Hence, there were proposals for a constitutional
amendment requiring a balanced budget, 2 a rule requiring
supermajority approval of tax increases in the House, 3 and a
delegation to the President of an enhanced role in the budgetary
4
process somewhat inaccurately styled the "line-item veto."
Our panel today will discuss these and other proposals. Are
they necessary? Are they effective? Are they constitutional? Allow
me to introduce our distinguished panel.
Let me begin by
introducing Professor Susan Low Bloch. Professor Bloch is a
professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, having
joined the faculty in 1982. She teaches constitutional law and a
seminar on the Supreme Court. She's the author of numerous
articles in the areas of constitutional and administrative law, and
is the co-author of the Westlaw publication, Supreme Court Politics:
The Institution and its Procedures.5 Before joining the Georgetown
Law Center, Professor Bloch served as a law clerk for Justice
Thurgood Marshall' and for D.C. Circuit Judge Spotswood
Robinson. She also practiced law at the Washington, D.C. law
firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Ms. Bloch received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan, where she graduated summa
cum laude. She was one of the seventeen well-known law
professors who wrote an open letter to Speaker Gingrich
challenging

the constitutionality

of House Rule XXI, 6 which

provides that no bill carrying a federal income tax rate increase
shall be considered as passed except by a three-fifths vote of the
7
House.

2s.J. Res. 54, 104th Cong. (1996).
3

S. 165, 104th Cong. (1995).
4S. 4,104th Cong. (1996).
5

SUSAN L BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLMCS: THE
INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES (1994).
6
H. Res. 6, 104th Cong. § 106 (1995) (enacted as House Rule XXI(5)(c) and (d)).
House Rule XXI reads in pertinent part:
No bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a
Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as passed or agreed to
unless so determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the members
voting.
Id.

7 Bruce Ackerman et al., Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1994).
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To her right, Professor Michael Rappaport wrote an article
responding to the open letter and defending the constitutionality
of House Rule XXI. 8 Professor Rappaport is a professor of law at
the University of San Diego School of Law, where he teaches
administrative, insurance, environmental, and banking law.
Prior to his appointment at the law school, Professor Rappaport
was associated with the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
where he specialized in appellate litigation.
He was also an
attorney advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department
of Justice, and was Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General in the Tax Division at Justice. A graduate of Yale Law
School, Professor Rappaport clerked for the Honorable Delores
Slovater in the Third Circuit.
To his right sits Representative David Skaggs. Representative
Skaggs represents the Second Congressional District of Colorado.
He is a graduate of Yale Law School and was a captain in the
United States Marine Corps.
An administrative assistant to
former-Congressman Timothy Wirth, Representative Skaggs was
first elected to the Colorado House of Representatives in 1980,
where he served as House Minority Leader. Congressman Skaggs
was elected to the 100th Congress in 1986 and has been reelected
to each succeeding Congress. He is a plaintiff in Skaggs v. Car/e,9 a
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of House Rule XXI, now
before the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
To my right is Representative David McIntosh, who has
represented Indiana's Second Congressional District since 1994.
Representative McIntosh received his law degree from the
University of Chicago in 1983, where he studied under thenProfessor Antonin Scalia. Representative McIntosh served as
special assistant to President Reagan for domestic affairs and as
special assistant to Attorney General Meese in the Reagan
Administration, specializing in constitutional law. In the Bush
Administration, Representative McIntosh served as special
assistant to Vice President Quayle, and was executive director of
the President's Council on Competitiveness.
Prior to that
8 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajonty Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995).
9110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming District Court ruling in favor of defendants
on grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injury was hypothetical
rather than actual).
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appointment, Representative McIntosh served as the Vice
President's deputy legal counsel. As we will hear, Representative
McIntosh favors House Rule XXI.
Finally, Professor E. Donald Elliott is currently assistant
administrator and general counsel for the United States
Environmental Protection Agency. He serves as the primary legal
adviser to the administrator. Since 1981, Professor Elliott has
been a professor of law at the Yale Law School. He specializes in
environmental law and toxic torts, torts, and constitutional law,
and has authored numerous articles in professional journals.
Professor Elliott is a 1974 graduate of Yale Law School. Following
his graduation from law school, he served as law clerk to United
States District Judge Gerhard Gesell and United States Circuit
Judge David Bazelon.
We will hear first from Professor Bloch.
PROFESSOR BLOCH: Thank you. Well, I agree that Congress
needs to be more disciplined. It has at times become sloppy and
occasionally cavalier. It was asking for trouble when it enacted
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.10 The legislation said
absolutely nothing about any effect on interstate commerce, and
it was, therefore, not surprising to see the Supreme Court do what
Senator Orrin Hatch called a wake-up call and strike the law down
last spring in the Lopez case. 11 So I do think that Congress should
be more responsible and more respectful of constitutional
restraints.
I also believe that the budget is a serious problem.
The
numbers are fairly staggering, but I believe we should be wary of
crafting new constitutional and quasi-constitutional limitations
on the spending power. Many of the proposed constitutional
amendments, such as a balanced budget amendment, are in my
opinion, unwise; and many of the quasi-constitutional statutory
fixes, such as the supermajority requirement for tax increases, are
both unwise and unconstitutional.
Let me address the specifics of the supermajority requirement.
As you just heard and as you undoubtedly know, the 104th
Congress adopted as one of its internal rules of proceeding, Rule
10

18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Act unconstitutional as an
illegitimate use of the Commerce Clause).
11
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XXI(5); this rule provides that no bill increasing a federal income
tax rate shall be considered as passed except by a three-fifths
vote. 12 The goal is to make it harder to get tax increases passed.
I'm not sure of the wisdom of having such a rule, especially
when there's no corresponding impediment to spending bills;
but more importantly, I believe that the House cannot
constitutionally adopt such a rule. Proponents of the rule say that
under Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings; 1 and they argue that is all
that the House has done here. But the supermajority requirement
contained in Rule XXI is not merely a rule of internal procedure;
it is, in effect, a presentment rule. It is not like the filibuster rule
which governs when things come to a vote. 14 This rule determines
when things get presented to the other House and to the President.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution defines how a law is to
be enacted. In particular, the so-called Presentment Clause of
Section 7 provides that every bill which shall have passed the
House and Senate shall, before it becomes law, be presented to
the President. 15 So what the House has done in Rule XXI is to
define the word "passed" in the Presentment Clause. Both sides
of this debate agree with the presumption that "passed" means
"agreed to by a majority of a quorum."
The question really is whether either House can by rule change
that meaning and insist that "passed" requires something more
than a majority. It is not an easy question. There are good
arguments on both sides. But on balance, I am persuaded that
the much better argument is that neither House can impose
supermajority requirements. Allowing the House to adopt such a
requirement unconstitutionally intrudes on the powers of the
Senate and the President, and let me explain why.
I agree there is nothing in the text that explicitly denies the
House the power to require a supermajority, but that is true of
many constitutional limits we infer by looking at the structure of

12 See supra note 6.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 states, in relevant part 'Each House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings....
14The filibuster is a consequence of the Senate's cloture rule. S. Doc. No. 104-1, at 22
(1995).
L5U.S. CONST. ar I, § 7, cl. 2.
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the Constitution. Chadha,16 in which the Supreme Court struck
down the legislative veto, is a good example. The constitutional
text does not explicitly say that Congress cannot use a legislative
veto.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court inferred such a
prohibition from the structure of the Constitution. Similarly, in
Nixon v. Fitzgral417 nothing in the Constitution says that the
President has immunity from civil damage actions for official
acts. Yet there also, the Supreme Court inferred such a limitation
from the text and structure of the Constitution.
So the question we face is: Even though the Constitution does
not explicitly prohibit either House from requiring a
supermajority to pass a bill, is such a requirement consistent with
the purposes of Article I and the principles of separation of
powers? I believe it is not.
Article I, Section 7, the provision that defines how a law is
enacted, is a carefully crafted mechanism in which the Framers
struck a balance between large and small states, between state and
federal governments, between the House and the Senate, and
between Congress and the President. By adopting this three-fifths
rule, the House unconstitutionally
upsets this carefully
constructed balance.
When the Framers wanted to require a supermajority, they
knew how to do so. In fact, they did so in several contexts,
requiring two-thirds votes to override a presidential veto, 18 to ratify
a treaty,19 to convict and impeach an official,2D to propose
amendments to the Constitution, 2' and to expel a Member from
Congress.22 Proponents of the supermajority rule argue that the
Framers may have meant this list to be simply the minimal list of
occasions that require supermajorities and that they intended to
let Congress add to the list; and that is, on its face, a plausible
reading. But when one considers what the impact on the other
16 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

17 457U.S. 731 (1982).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

19 U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, d. 2 (providing that two-thirds of the Senators present must
concur in the making of treaties by the President).
2D U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that in impeachment proceedings, two-thirds
of all Senators present must concur in the conviction).
21
U.S. CONST. art. V.
22 U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2.
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branches is, I conclude that when the Framers did not specify a
supermajority, they not only presumed that a majority would be
sufficient, they, in fact, intended not to allow either chamber to
increase the number of votes required.
Now, consider the potential impact of such a supermajority
rule. Under the view of supporters of supermajority rules, there is
no limit on the supermajority requirement. Thus, the House
could require a ninety percent or one-hundred percent majority
for selected topics, or even for all legislation. If the House adopts
such a ninety or one-hundred percent rule, then even if most
Representatives and a majority of Senators want a particular bill, it
could not get presented to the President and could never become
law. If the House can do this, it has the power unilaterally to
enhance its power vis-a-vis the Senate and the President. Instead
of being just one of three relatively equal players, the House, by
this rule, makes itself a super-player.
Furthermore, if the House can adopt such a rule so can the
Senate. Article I, Section 5 provides that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and does not distinguish
between the House and the Senate. Thus, the Senate could say
that the power to confirm judges and cabinet officials, once
nominated by the President, will henceforth require a two-thirds
vote of the Senate to get confirmed. If the Senate were allowed to
adopt such a rule, it would be able, single-handedly, to limit the
power the Constitution gives to the President in the appointment
process.
Finally, defenders of the supermajority rule say it is not too
restrictive because a simple majority can repeal it. But I see
nothing in their logic that would stop the House or the Senate
from saying that repeal of the supermajority rule will itself require
a supermajority.
Some supporters, including, I think, Professor Rappaport,
argue that the House cannot do that: that it cannot require a
supermajority to repeal a supermajority rule. They argue that
legislative standing rules are valid only if the rules are themselves
subject to repeal by a majority vote; and they read this restriction
into the Section 5 Rules of Proceeding Clause.2 Now, whether or
not this is a correct reading of Section 5, I am not sure; but the
25Se

supra note 13.
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perceived need to read such a simple majority requirement into
the Section supports my position. When a House, by its rules,
goes beyond mere internal housekeeping and affects the
relationship among the other institutional players, it distorts the
finely wrought legislative process-carefully crafted by the
Framers-and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
The topic for today is Congress and the need for self-discipline,
and as I indicated, I agree that Congress needs self-discipline.
The discipline should not come from gimmicky rules, but from
careful deliberation and concern for the future.
I am not
categorically opposed to so-called structural statutes or to
Congress' efforts to bind itself to the mast as it did in the GrammRudman Act. 24 Indeed, some of Congress' past structural efforts,
such as the Budget and Impoundment Control Act,2 have usefully
resolved some conflicts between the President and Congress.
I simply urge caution, so we avoid quick fixes that undermine
our constitutional system or evade the underlying problem. True
self-discipline comes not by turning to quick-fix diet pills, but by
pushing back from the table.
PROFESSOR RAPPAPORT: Although Professor Bloch spoke
about the House rule, I'm going to focus my remarks now on
constitutional amendments; but I would be happy to talk about
the House rule in question.
Today, I would like to defend the use of supermajority rules as a
means of limiting fiscal powers of the federal government. Now,
in making this argument, I want to say that I'm relying on some
research that John McGinnis and I worked on together, and on
which we are planning on publishing an article.25 So he gets part
of the blame for this.
I want to argue that the Constitution should be amended to
permit Congress to pass various types of fiscal legislation only
with a supermajority of each House. The supermajority might be
two-thirds or three-fifths. Various supermajority rules might be
employed. You could have supermajorities required to borrow
2 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
2 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
25John 0.

McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supesmajoriy Rules as a Constitutional

Solution (forthcoming).

1997]

The Taxing and Spending Powers

money, to raise taxes, or to spend money. I do not want to
advocate today any particular supermajority rule. Rather, what I
want to do is explain why supermajority rules would help solve
some of our problems in the political process. And I'll also want
to defend supermajority rules against two objections: first, that
they would assign inappropriate powers to the judiciary; and
secondly, that they're inconsistent with the democratic nature of
our Constitution. I will argue that supermajority rules could be
designed that are compatible with a limited judiciary, and that
they are entirely consistent with the republican nature of our
Constitution.
Now, the main reason to adopt supermajority rules is that there
are significant defects in the political process, and supermajority
rules have the potential to remedy these defects. In particular,
there are strong reasons to believe that the political process
results in excessive debt, excessive spending, and excessive
taxation. Indeed, it's not surprising that since World War II, we've
had a tremendous growth in social spending, as a percentage of
GNP, and we've also had a tremendous growth in debt. The
reason for the excessive debt is obvious. Deficit financing is a way
of forcing future generations to pay for existing expenditures.
The reason for excessive spending and excessive taxes is largely
the power of special interests. Certain interests are able to exert
disproportionate influence in the political process.
These
interests then secure additional spending, and this excessive
spending must eventually be financed with excessive taxes or
excessive debt. Supermajority rules would make it more difficult
to pass additional borrowing, spending, or taxes.
Under a
supermajority rule for debt, it will be more difficult for the
existing generation to borrow money. Under a supermajority rule
for taxes or spending, it will be more difficult for special interests
to secure the spending or financing for their programs.
It's sometimes argued that supermajority rules are not needed
because Congress has the power to solve these problems on its
own, but this argument, I think, is mistaken. After all, Congress
also has the power not to abridge freedom of speech; but no one
argues that we don't need the First Amendment. The problem is
that Congress is not designed to really protect the freedom of
speech.

Journal of Law & Politics
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Similarly, the structure of the political process suggests that
Congress will not be able to restrain the excessive spending and
excessive debt on their own. After all, in the last generation,
Congress has passed legislation every couple of years that it
designed to solve these problems. First, we got the Congressional
Budget Act.27 Then we got Gramm-Rudman.2B Then we got the
Budget Enforcement Act.29 Each time, Congress promises to solve
a problem, but it never seems to; and the reason, I think, in the
end is somewhat simple. Excessive debt and excessive spending
are supported by powerful political interests. If Congress really
attempted to restrain such excess, many of the Members would
end up losing their jobs, or that's the fear. Thus, we really need
some kind of change in the structure of our government,
something like supermajority rules.
While supermajority rules might remedy the defects in the
political process, it's often argued that they're dangerous because
they rely on the courts. This objection takes two forms. First, it's
argued that supermajority rules require the courts to enforce
them, but the courts cannot really be trusted to enforce the
written Constitution. After all, if the courts had simply enforced
the Commerce Clause, we now wouldn't necessarily have such a
big problem with the federal fiscal legislation.
The second argument is that supermajority rules would provide
the courts with new powers that are inappropriate for the
judiciary. For example, it's argued that the balanced budget
amendment would require the courts to make spending and
taxing decisions.)
I believe supermajority rules can be designed that would avoid
these problems. Indeed, if they're designed properly, the courts
might even function better in this area than they do in the
traditional areas of the Constitution.
The key to designing supermajority rules is to keep the role of
the courts as simple as possible. Consider the so-called balanced
budget amendment. The amendment should not require that the
27 Se supra note 25.
2 See supra note 24.
29 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.).
to See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment:
Accountants? A Look at State Experience, 12J. L. & POL. 153 (1996).

IH Judges Become
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courts ensure there is a balanced budget every year. Rather, the
amendment should be designed with the more limited aim of
ensuring that a supermajority authorizes the issuance of debt.
Under this type of amendment, the main test for the courts would
be the limited one of defining what is debt. The court's role here
would be much more limited, or limited in at least several
respects more than it is under traditional constitutional
constraints such as the First Amendment.
Under the First Amendment, the courts make virtually all of
the decisions as to whether speech can be restrained. The Court,
first of all, decides whether an action constitutes speech, such as
campaign contributions or flag burning. Then the Court says the
reasons why you can restrain speech, and also decides whether, in
that particular case, those reasons justify the restraint.
By
contrast, under a supermajority rule for debt, the courts simply
decide whether the government has issued the debt. They don't
decide, first of all, what are the legitimate reasons for issuing the
debt; and they don't decide whether those reasons justify the
issuance of debt at this particular time. Rather, it's Congress that
decides these issues.
The reduced role of the judiciary under supermajority rules has
two important advantages. First, the courts have less discretion,
and, therefore, there's less chance that they will abuse their
authority. Secondly, they will have less incentive, if you will, to gut
supermajority rules.
In the past, courts have sometimes not enforced constitutional
restrictions when those restrictions would conflict with a
powerful political consensus.
In these situations,
the
conventional wisdom is that the courts have feared that they will
reduce their political capital if they make a controversial
decision. That seems to be the explanation for why the courts
relaxed the enforcement of the Commerce Clause during the New
Deal. Under supermajority rules, the courts will never have to tell
a truly powerful political consensus they cannot do what they
want, and the reason for that is simple:
If there is such a
consensus, they will be able to obtain a supermajority in
Congress. For example, the Commerce Clause might have lasted
longer if, instead of prohibiting regulations of interstate
commerce, it had permitted regulations of interstate commerce
with a supermajority. Congress could have passed the regulations

536
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during the New Deal, and the courts would not have had to relax
In this way, supermajority rules permit the
the provision.
Constitution to bend, so that it does not break.
Another argument has been that judicial remedies for a
violation of supermajority rules would require the courts to
exercise discretion over budgetary decisions.3 ' Again, the role of
the courts here will depend on how the amendment is designed.
Many versions of the balanced budget amendment don't define
remedies, and they therefore created the risk that the courts may
get involved. But a balanced budget amendment could be
designed to avoid this risk. For example, the amendment could
specify that unless Congress provides otherwise, the remedy
should be a proportional sequester of outlays implemented by the
President. In other words, the President would reduce spending
an equivalent amount in each part of the budget. This has two
advantages. First, it avoids judicial discretion. Secondly, it gives
Congress an incentive not to violate the amendment because
Congress doesn't want to give the President, who is its
institutional rival, this type of power.
Let me now just very briefly consider the other criticism made
that they're inconsistent with the
of supermajority rules:
democratic nature of our Constitution. Here, the argument is
that, essentially, our Constitution is based on majority rule, and
supermajority rules conflict with this principle. Let me say that,
first of all, the Framers didn't establish a simple democracy, but
instead, a republic-a system that relies on elections, but departs
from simple majority rule when to do so would improve the
system. Certainly, that is the case for the Bill of Rights. But it is
also true with respect to things like bicameralism and the
presidential veto. It is well known that bicameralism functions
like a supermajority requirement. To secure a majority in two
different houses, which are elected by two different groups of
voters, requires more support than securing a majority in one
house. Thus it is simply false to describe the Constitution as
The Framers actually made
adopting simple majority rule.
supermajority rule a hidden, but essential part of our

S3eTobin supra note 30, at 154.
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Constitution.3
The supermajority rules I'm advocating are
consistent with this republican interpretation.
It's time to conclude. To reiterate, I think supermajority rules
would be an important improvement to our Constitution. They
are likely to restrain the excessive debt, spending, and taxes that
have come to afflict us; and I think they can be made to be
consistent with both a limited judiciary and the republican nature
of our Constitution.
REPRESENTATIVE SKAGGS:
Good afternoon. I want to
establish, first of all, the nature of the audience. Would everyone
who is an attorney please raise your hand? Pause. I was afraid of
that. But given that at least we have a plurality from among the
Bar, and since I am substituting for Lloyd Cutler this afternoon, I
thought I could trot out that old saw from law school. Lloyd
happens to be my lawyer in the three-fifths litigation that is
pending,3 and we all remember what we learned in law school,
that the client who has himself for a lawyer has a fool for a client.
I am just wondering what the variation of that is on the lawyer
that allows his client to substitute for him, but you can all draw
your own inferences from that.
I also wanted to begin, in appropriate "CNN" fashion, with
some 'factoids' to keep in mind as we deliberate on this
afternoon's subject.
Two-fifths of the United States Senate, the remainder if you
require three-fifths to act, represent less than twelve percent of
the people of this country, if you select your Senators carefully.-"
One-third of the Senate may represent as little as eight percent of
the people of the country, the remainder if you require two-thirds
to get something done.
Another factoid is that, notwithstanding our undisciplined
current state of affairs, we are in the fourth straight year of
significant reduction in the federal deficit. This is the result of
many factors, but among them is the passage of the 1993 budget
package by one vote in the House and one vote in the Senate.
2SJAMES BUCHANON & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 23349

(1962).

83 Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831 (1997).

SeLynn
*
Baker& Samuel Dinkin, The Senat&'An Instittion Whose Tine Has Gone?, 13
J.L. & POL. 21, 29 n.27 (1997) (stating that due to minimum quorums, senators
representing as few as 4.4% of the population can block legislation).
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This package included some tax provisions that have made a
significant contribution to deficit reduction, presumably one of
our objectives in having this topic before us this afternoon.
I am proud to be a Member of the United States Congress. It is
a challenging environment in which to inflict self-discipline, as
I'm sure my colleague, David McIntosh, will elaborate upon as
well. That problem has given rise to many bad jokes, among
them being the question, what is the difference between a Cub
Scout pack and the House of Representatives? The answer is, the
Cub Scouts have adult supervision. I really don't believe that, but
it does capture the essence of what we're trying to get at this
afternoon, which is: How do we get more adult supervision in
Congress? How do we create an environment in which we will be
more mature about our responsibilities, especially when it comes
to the matter of fiscal discipline?
The seductive allure is that we will somehow find that
"adultness" by imposing more rules on ourselves, whether
internally through changes in the Rules of the House, statutorily
through things
like
the line-item
veto provision,
or
constitutionally through something like the balanced budget
amendment. What I would like to suggest is that, in addition to
examining these notions as a matter of jurisprudence or
constitutional law or theory, we also entertain the concept of
'legisprudence,'
if you will-what do we want from our
legislature? Given that it is a powerful and important surrogate
for much less pleasant ways of resolving disputes in society, when
do we want the pent-up frustrations, even of a large majorityconceivably eighty-seven percent of our people-to be frustrated
by a supermajority requirement? Is that prudent as a way for this
society to organize itself?
My experience has been-and I've only been at this for ten
years-that by continuing to pretend that the answer is in the
rules, we fail to recognize that the answer is in ourselves. By
thinking that we can create a structure in which mere
compliance is the answer to this problem, not only do we avoid
coming to terms with the need for mature judgment and
discretion-more 'adult' behavior, if you will-but we unwittingly
let loose even more destructive powers within our experiment in
self-government and our "legisprudence."
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What do I mean by that, and how can I prove the case? Well, I
think that it is in the nature of this beast that the more we adopt
rules, the more we think that virtue is defined by compliance with
rules and the more incentives we unwittingly create to figure out
how not to comply. What are the ways around the rules? What
acts of deviousness can undermine, while still having the virtuepurported virtue-of compliance and nonetheless give vent to the
pressures that have to be resolved through the national
legislature? We need to look no farther than what's happened
with the three-fifths rule adopted as an internal disciplining
measure for the United States House of Representatives3 and the
fact that every time a bill has come to the floor over the last two
years that has required or seems to require addressing the need
for a supermajority, the majority has preceded legislation with a
rule waiving the three-fifths rule. In other words, they are unable
to comply with their own purported act of self-discipline.
It seems to me that noncompliance, which eventually shifts
into a certain intellectual deviousness, merely aggravates the
public's concerns and cynicism, leading to further mistrust of our
ability to behave as adults and, ironically, gives rise to even more
pressure to adopt more rules, which we will then try to figure out
ways not to comply with.
So I suggest that we would be much better off as a civic society
looking for ways to make sure that we elect people of judgment
and maturity to these jobs rather than figuring out how we adopt
different rules for the Cub Scout pack.
This is demonstrated not only in our experience with the
three-fifths rule, but even with the non-rule that everyone
embraced over the last two years of getting to the balanced budget
in seven years, in which both the President's proposal and the
Republican majority proposal, while appearing to comply-while
having the virtue of nominal compliance-were, in fact, deviant
proposals. They either finessed the really hard decisions of how
we were going to get to "balance" in the year 2002, as both
proposals did, or they resorted to the even more cynicisminducing artifice, as the majority budget did, of contriving a
change in the determination of the basis for assets in calculating
capital gains, so as to produce an artificial bump-up in capital
SH. Res. 6, 104th Cong. (1995) (adopted as House Rule XXI(5)(c) and (d)).
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gains receipts in the year 2002-a one-year-only event, after which
the budget would implode again into deficit. These approaches
may achieve a veneer of compliance by 2002, but do not exhibit a
real systemic addressing of the problem.
We are seeing the same thing now with the effort that we said
we made last year to deal with the line-item veto. There was a
piece in The Washington Times the other day that says now that
President Clinton has been reelected, a lot of advocates of that
legislation are having second thoughts s6 But, those of you who
are lawyers think about the absurdity of one of the sections in this
line item veto proposal which gives the President five days after
signing a bill to go back in and cross out provisions. It's sort of
like 'springing executory interests' in the law of trusts and
estates. s7 This is a springing executory retroactive veto.
Now, give me a break. Again, we have kidded ourselves that by
having passed a new rule, we have somehow gotten to the
substance of the matter. In fact, all of these things, I submit to
you, are a way of avoiding the issue. The issue is entitlements.
That is the part of the budget that is growing. That is where the
real risk to fiscal sanity and long-term stability for the country is.
The more we delude ourselves into thinking that, by passing a
three-fifths rule or a line-item veto or any of these other
gimmicks, we've really solved the problem, the more we spend our
energy on the wrong problem, and the less well we serve you and
the rest of the country.
REPRESENTATIVE McINTOSH: Thank you. I wanted to talk
with you about three forms of changes that I think should be
made that would allow us to comply with the majority wishes of
reducing the size of government and shrinking its influence in
this country. Along the way, I'll talk about the relative merits of
different ways of approaching this issue: the balanced budget
amendment, the supermajority limitation on tax increases, and
some type of limit, probably best statutory, on the ability of
agencies to pass new regulations.
What I encountered talking with people over the last three
years is that there are two sentiments that the public has that are
-96Brian Bloomquist, LiUneitem Veto Badkers Now Skeptica4 Worry About Use by Clinton,
May Test its ConstitutionaliUy, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at Al0.
TJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 755
(5th ed. 1995).
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in tension with each other. First, when you go and talk with
people at a factory who are working for a living and you ask them
if there is any message that they want their Congressman to take
back to Washington, the number one message is, "Cut our taxes;
the government is taking too much out of our wallet; it's difficult
to make ends meet; my wife and I are both working, and it doesn't
seem like we're getting ahead." Variants on that comment come
up over and over and over again.
The second sentiment is that they don't trust politicians to
actually do that, and I think we saw that in this last election,
where Senator Dole had a very strong proposal for reducing the
tax burden geared towards middle-class, working families. People
indicated that they didn't believe that he would actually do it, if
elected. That sentiment carried over, I think, to other politicians
because of doubts that they would follow through on election year
promises to reduce taxes and reduce the size of government.
Why is this? I think the reason is that we're seeing a public
reaction to what has been, essentially, a Democratic majority for
the last forty years. In the Congress, the Democrats were in
In the Executive for many of the recent years,
control.
Republicans were in control. But you had a bipartisan consensus
that at election time, it was good to talk about reducing taxes and
reducing the size of government, but afterwards we had to govern,
and that meant that we had to go back and figure out how not to
reduce, and, in many cases, how to increase taxes and increase the
regulatory burden. I don't want to say in a strictly partisan way
that it was simply my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. I
served with President Bush, and Dick Darman was an effective
advocate for increasing taxes. That is what I think of as an antidemocratic majority because they were ignoring the sentiment
that the public wants less government at this point in our history.
What can be done to change that sort of "mis-representation"
by the elected officials and elected bodies here in Washington, so
that we have a more democratic approach toward fulfilling what I
believe is a core value that the American people have at this point
of less-although still effective and efficient-government, lower
taxes, and less of a burden on their private lives?
Professor Bloch addressed the question of the rule change that
we made in the previous Congress, and I have to say I agree with
my colleague David Skaggs' criticism that we ended up waiving
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that three-fifths rule in each of the times when it might have been
applicable. And that, in fact, probably adds to the cynicism of
whether elected officials will follow through on their promises in
this area. By the way, I think probably the fact that it can be
waived by a majority takes away any of the constitutional problems
or at least effectively makes it something that is not a burden on
our constitutional structure because a simple majority still the
status quo.
Therefore, I think we need to seriously consider constitutional
changes, and a balanced budget and a tax limitation amendment
are two that I strongly favor. Originally, two years ago, they were
combined. We didn't have the votes to pass a balanced budget
with a tax limitation proposal; so we split them ouL And thanks
to John Shadegg, a colleague of mine in the freshman class, we
have a commitment from our leadership to bring the tax
limitation amendment back up very early this coming year in the
legislative calendar.aS I also think that there's a good chance that
we will see a balanced budget amendment approved by both
houses of Congress and sent to the States. I think the chief value
of this is not to create additional litigation or new rights that can
be enforced in court. I think the chief value of a balanced budget
amendment is to change the job description of our elected
officials. One of the things that motivates me and my colleagues
more than anything else is a high percentage of floor votes on
legislation. David Skaggs and I both worry about making sure we
don't miss votes because, in the election process, if we only show
up three-fifths of the time, the voters will be told about this by our
opponents, who will say, "What's he doing? He's off playing golf.
He's not doing what we sent him there to do." It doesn't matter
on the substance, but the fact that we missed the votes means that
we're not living up to our job description, that we're supposed to
be there voting on legislation, one way or the other.
If we have a constitutional amendment that says Congress must
balance the budget and present that to the President, I think that
then changes a congressman's job description. And the debate
in the election process is whether he has succeeded in achieving
what we sent him there to do. One of the jobs is to vote on bills.
M H.R.J. Res. 62, 105th Cong. (1997). See also 143 CONG. REC. H1506 (daily ed. April
15, 1997) (noting that the resolution failed by a vote of 233 to 190).
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One of them is to balance the budget for the country. That
political pressure is what will, in effect, lead to a balanced budget
much more than any legal requirement that may come out of this.
The tax limitation rule I favor for a different reason, which is
that if you have a goal of balancing the budget, you can do it in
several different ways. One of them is to increase revenues and
not decrease spending. That leads to a continued increase in
government. Tax limitation makes it harder to do that and,
therefore, changes the incentives in the elected bodies, giving us
a greater incentive for spending reductions as a way of reaching
that balanced budget goal.
I think also that we need to look at the cost of hidden taxesand that would be regulations-in considering this question of
whether we need structural changes to reduce the burden of
government on the public. If you look at regulations, they now
amount to about $500 to $600 billion in costs per year to societydepending on whose estimates you use-somewhere from onethird to one-half the level of the tax burden on society, with
significant changes in our economic behavior as a result.Y
Frankly, we also have a system that is no longer living up to its
purposes in many of the social functions for regulations. I don't
think we do a good job of using regulations to clean the
environment, to provide for worker safety, to have a healthier
America. When you've got a system where one-half of the funds
under Superfund4D are spent for lawyers and consultants rather
than actually cleaning up the environment, and when you've got
OSHA41 regulations where the number-one fine is for paperwork
violations rather than real safety concerns, and where the FDA
takes twice as long as other countries to approve new drugs in our
regulatory process,42 we fail to meet the social goals of having a
cleaner environment, a safer workplace, and a healthier America.
Break in tape.
... as part of the debt ceiling, we actually changed that formula
somewhat by creating a process where a "superminority'---what I
' Patrick Buchanan, Common Sense Reform" A Legislator's Viewpoint, 31 WAKE FOREST L
REV. 799, 802 (1996).

4D Hazardous Substances Superfund, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994).
41 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 - 659 (1994).
42
SeeJohn Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate
Times Require Desperate Measures, 44VAND. L REV. 925, 936 (1991).
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would call the opposite of a supermajority-would be able to force
Congress to address these regulations and bring them back for a
vote in the House and in the Senate.
The problem there is we're not organized to do that, and as a
result, the agencies, which are very efficient at what they're doing,
have figured out how to play games and avoid this new
requirement. We in Congress are behind the eight ball, if you
will, for failing to really find a structure and a process to bring
those back for a democratic review and a vote in the legislature.
I've got a proposal to do something, again analogous to what
the states have done, in the balanced-budget area. The states set
up joint committees to review these regulations through
procedures that have political consequences, and it works very
effectively in states like Ohio and Illinois.
Let me conclude by saying I think these rules will have
consequences for the policy choices that are made by our elected
officials, but chiefly what they will do is enable us to return to a
more democratic approach in our elected officials' actions. One
of the reasons they're opposed by anti-democratic "forces" in our
country-I think they no longer form a majority-is that they fear
that many of the changes that were brought about in the last forty
years would be changed as a result of these new rules.
I think supermajority rules would allow the public to have
greater influence on the process and, therefore, I strongly support
them and encourage these changes as rapidly as possible in the
political climate.
I think it's important, though, as we do that to remember that
we have to follow the rules in implementing them, which then
solves our anti-democratic criticism, because the rules require
supermajorities to change the Constitution. 4s But if we can pass
that obstacle, I think the results will greatly benefit us in reaching
back towards a more democratic goal of lesser government, of
lower taxes, and of less intrusion into people's lives-all of which
the public very clearly, as I have learned in talking to them over
the last three years, wants us to do, but is skeptical about the
political process in achieving those goals.
Thank you very much.

U.S. CONST. art. V.
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PROFESSOR ELLIOTT: Those of you who remember Thomas
Griffith's introduction of me may be wondering what the current
General Counsel of EPA is doing on this panel, and the answer is
he's got an old resume. I served as General Counsel of EPA in the
Bush administration. I was proud to serve as the right wing of the
left wing in the Bush administration, and I've been a professor at
Yale Law School since 1981. I'm currently also a partner in the
law firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker in Washington,
D.C..
I've both written about separation of powers issues and
constitutional law and also about environmental law and
environmental protection issues. What I want to talk about today
is congressional overspending as an example of environmental
pollution, and the lessons of environmental regulation as applied
to the problem of designing a system to regulate congressional
overspending.
The comments by my good friend, Sue Bloch, and by
Congressman Skaggs have really set up the issue of why we need
regulation in this area. I won't call either of them a "liberal,"
particularly in front of this audience, but I think it's extraordinary
that, among liberals, the one area where we don't need regulation
and where we ought to just let morality and self-restraint solve the
problem is in the spending area.
I want to argue that the same kinds of arguments that we're so
familiar with as justifications for other legal regulations, like
environmental regulation, are equally applicable here to the
problem of congressional overspending. And secondly, I want to
argue that some of the kinds of lessons that we've learned about
how to do regulation better should be brought to bear on the
question of how we regulate Congress, because that's really what
this is about, how we regulate Congress.
Now, that's an area where conservatives are at a little bit of a
disadvantage, because most conservatives spend their time
arguing against further regulation, not how to create regulation
to do it better. Through a series of coincidences, I've found myself
spending a lot of my life thinking about what we know about
regulation, what works and what doesn't.
I'm in a position of supporting most of the measures that we've
talked about.
I support the concept of supermajority
requirements, but unfortunately, I'm persuaded that they are
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unconstitutional when created by statute or rule. I support the
balanced budget amendment, but I agree with David that there
are some real problems in making it work.
What I'm thinking about is what the future of regulation in
this field ought to look like. Well, let me make the argument
about why controlling
Congressional spending is really
isomorphic to, or similar in structural form to the classic
arguments for the need for regulation.
As in the environmental area, what we have here is a very
decentralized system with lots of decision makers-in this
instance, political actors or members of Congress. And those
people are able to appropriate a large portion of the gain from
taking a particular action-namely, reelection-by promising
benefits either to the special interests or to the voters. By doing
so, they externalize a large portion of the costs onto others,
including future generations-an issue very well-known in the
environmental
areaothers outside the district,
and
unorganized groups who are not paying attention to hidden
taxes. 44

This is the classic structure of a problem that, in every other
instance, cries out for regulation in the mind of the liberal. It's a
"Tragedy of the Commons" problem; it's a "Prisoner's Dilemma"
problem; it's a "public-goods" problem. 45 It's a situation where
we'd all be better off if we could simply restrain ourselves, but we
can't.
Now, morality is certainly relevant, just like morality is relevant
in the environmental area. There are altruists. There are people
who will restrain their own tendency to pollute. There are people
like David McIntosh, who are in favor of fiscal restraint.45 But
what we know about human nature-and I think St. Thomas
Aquinas really went to the core of the issue when he said that law
is really about defects in human nature. 47 While there are good

44 For an elaboration, see E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit,
1985 DUKE LJ. 1, and authorities cited therein, especially Petersen.
45
See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 34, at 33 n.34 (1997) (noting that the "race to the
bottom" and the "tragedy of the commons" are both variants of the Prisoner's Dilemma).

46 See David McIntosh, The Faderalist Society Conferenc" Civil Justice and the Litigation
Process: Do the Merits and the Search for Truth Matter Anymore? Day One, 41 N.Y.L. SC-. L

REV. 513, 515 & n.a (1997).
47JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 35-36 (1980).
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aspects in human beings, as Madison said, if men were angels, we
wouldn't need government.8 Yes, there is altruism. Yes, there is
some ability to "push away from the table" (as Professor Bloch and
Representative Skaggs termed Congressional self-restraint in
their oral remarks). Yes, there's fiscal restraint. But there's not
enough of it, and in some instances, we need legal regulation in
addition to altruism and morality. 49
The arguments in favor of legal regulation here are perfectly
analogous to the classic arguments for regulation in other areas.
Now, one of the things that we know about the need for
regulation is that the best way to regulate, as in the
environmental area, would be to come up with incentives and a
better specification of property rights. I haven't figured out how
to do that in this area, but I want to acknowledge that that would
be the first best approach. Essentially, what we're talking about
today is the use of various forms of command-and-control
regulation, analogous to those we have used in the environmental
area, to deal with an analogous problem of congressional
spending.
Ijust want to note in passing that this is not a unique analysis.
The regulatory reform bill in the last Congress ° essentially
utilized all of the same techniques used by our environmental
laws as a kind of meta-system to regulate the regulatorsSL-the
same mechanisms of petitioning and requiring environmental
impact statements. So we need to use similar techniques to
regulate Congressional over-spending.
Let me make four points which I think are lessons from what
we learned in environmental law about how to regulate better.
The first is that you've got to make the problem visible. We've tried i n
many areas to regulate without having made the problem visible,
without really having the goods, and every time you do that, you
fail. So, I'm in favor of measures which make it clear to the public
exactly how much of their money we're spending. There was a
48THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

49 For an elaboration of the argument that legal regulation compensates for insufficient
altruism in large communities, see E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The new Synthesis, 41
ST. LOUIS L REV. 595, 607-610 (1997) (Childress Lecture).
5DRegulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong.
51 Se generally Symposium, Regulating Regulation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1994)
(Jim Hamilton, ed.).
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recent article by Walter Williams in The Washington Times, who
advocates that we disclose to the public the hidden costs of
government taxes in everything that we buy.For the same
reason that I believe that disclosure is a valuable tool in the
environmental area, I think the first step to building a strong
popular consensus to support the kinds of regulatory measures
that are necessary is enhanced disclosure in this area.
I also agree with David that the real issue here is not just the
deficit. That's one of the issues. But the real issue, in the long
term, is the total amount of goods that are allocated by the public
sector as opposed to the private sector. The deficit is an
accounting concept.
It's an important accounting concept
because of the future generations issue. But the real questionand it was the fundamental question in the last election and will
be in elections for years to come-is what percentage of total
national wealth is going to be allocated privately as opposed to by
the public sector?
The second point that I want to make, again, a lesson from
regulation in the environmental area, is that we should measure
progress in terms of changes in behavior rather than in terms of juridical
acts, rather than in terms of particular legal actions
implemented. The example in the environmental area is we
always measured environmental progress in terms of numbers of
enforcement cases brought. We've learned that we need better
indicators of actual performance-how things actually change.
That's one of the reasons I support a capital budget. One of
the first things that we've got to do is we've got to have an honest
game; we have to have a very good way of tracking what we're
actually doing and get past some of these accounting tricks.
The third point I would make-again, a lesson from theories of
regulation, one of those black arts that conservatives don't read
that much, but one of the things that we've learned in theories of
regulation.
Generally, we regulate more effectively through
affecting behavioral incentives, rather than having flat legal bans. The
concept in environmental law of flat legal bans is called

-Walter Williams, Covert Taxes and Your Right to Know, WASH. TMES, Nov. 3, 1996
(arguing that "if workers are better informed aout government costs, they might make
different political choices.").
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aspirational lawmaking,-O like the Clean Water Act of 1972,54
which was very similar to Gramm-Rudman or the budget act; you
simply declare legally that we're going to get rid of something
and then you can all go home and feel good. That doesn't work,
for a whole variety of reasons.
What you've got to do is affect the incentive structure of the
decision makers.
In this instance, the decision maker is not
"Congress," not a collective construct, but individual members of
Congress. We need to be designing measures that go to the
incentives that affect members of Congress.
I've got a couple of quick suggestions.
The first is one that I mentioned in an article on this topic that
I published in the Duke Law Journal in 1985 called "Constitutional
Conventions and the Deficit."-M I support a lot of these measures,
but my own particular pet measure is to move the national
elections to April 16th. If we voted the day after we paid our
federal taxes, it would actually do more to change the dynamic on
the real issue than a lot of the more conventional "serious"
measures we are discussing. This gets at the incentive structure,
which is really causing the problem.
Another more familiar approach is: Let's put members of
Congress on a profit-sharing plan. Throughout industry, people
are given targets, and if they meet their targets, they get bonuses.
What's wrong with the idea of passing a statute that would give
members of Congress a twenty-five or fifty percent bonus in salary
if Congress meets its spending targets-this is peanuts in the
scheme of things. We could pay them each a million dollars in
additional compensation if the Congress as a whole met these
targets.
Again what that illustrates is, if you want to regulate effectively,
stop talking about legal bans that will constrain Congress as a
whole; start talking about the incentives for behavior by
individual members of Congress-again, a lesson from the
environmental area.

3Se Daved Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rule Statutes: The Cost of the Clean Air Act, 30
U.C.LA L. REV. 210 (1983); see also Richard Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrus4 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991).
5Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
-' 1 9 8 5 DUKE L.J. 1077.
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The last point is that one of the things that we've learned is
that a very effective technique for achieving a change in behavior
is to threaten people with something that they perceive as even womse than
what you want them to do.-5
In the environmental area, we
generally call this a "hammer." 57 When I studied the history of
citizens' movements for constitutional conventions, I discovered
that we'd very rarely had constitutional conventions, but the
reason that we hadn't had them very often is, every time a serious
public movement got going to call one, Congress would respond
preemptively by trying to solve the problem before people got to
constitutional conventions.
So, I'm not quite as pessimistic as my comments might have
suggested. I believe that if we continue to threaten members of
Congress with something that they perceive as even worse in
terms of restricting their powers (such as the "balanced budget
amendment"), that may, in fact, increase the degree to which they
behave responsibly. Threatening with something worse is a wellrecognized form of regulation.
Thanks very much.
MR. GRIFFITH: I want to thank our panelists. We have
enough time now for some questions. What I would propose to
do is that, if you will raise your hand, I will recognize you, and
then if you will direct your question to a specific panel member.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: For Representative McIntosh: one way
I think that Congress might impose some discipline on itself
through affecting the incentives of the decision makers is by
making the laws that it imposes on everybody else apply to itself,
which, of course, was the point of the Congressional
Accountability Act. I read in this morning's Washington Times that
the Republican-led Congress is seeking court relief from that very
law in the context of the attempt to unionize the Capital Police. 58
I was wondering if you might comment on whether that's an

6See generally E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a
Theor ofStatutwy Evolutio." The Federalization ol Environmental Law, I J. L. ECON. & ORG.
313 (1985) (describing a "politicians dilemma

in which actors coalesce on their second.

best preferences when threatened with a worse outcome).
57 See Richard Fortuna, RCRA: The Birth of the Hammer, 7 ENVrL. F. 18 (Sept./Oct.

1990).
M Brian Bloomquist, GOP Leaders Plan to Stall Part of 'Contract,' Capitol Police Seek Right
to Unionize, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al.

1997]

The Taxing and SpendingPowers

example of somebody looking too much at the one very specific
issue and not looking at the big picture.
REPRESENTATIVE McINTOSH: Let me comment on that and
share with you an insight on the problem there.
The problem that you mention of the Congressional
Accountability Act is one of, I think, a generational shift that is
occurring in the country, because we applied all the labor laws to
Congress, one of which would, if interpreted the way it is on
business, allow clerical employees in Congress to be able to
unionize, and the problem that Members have with that is, if
they've got a clerical employee who is in their office who also
ends up doing policy work for them, they would have an ability to
be able to control that person as they're giving them information
on how to vote on issues and what their constituents think about
different bills.
The solution that some of the older generation came up with
was, let's go back and exempt ourselves from that particular
provision in law. We had a debate on that, and the newer
Members-and I don't want to say just the freshmen, because it
was people in the classes ahead of us who had been recently
elected-all said, "You don't understand; the purpose of the
Congressional Accountability Act is to force us to live under these
laws and, if they aren't working, go back and change them,
because there are analogous problems in society that are created
by those laws."
The result was that the proposal to give us an exemption was
shelved, but I haven't seen the article in the Washington Times. I'm
sure they are still trying to figure out how to avoid this
consequence of that bill, and my answer to that is: go in and look
at the labor laws and figure out if you've written them correctly,
and I think that's the better solution.
This is for Congressman Skaggs.
AUDIENCE MEMBER:
While I share your concern about the efficacy of these provisions,
if you're truly in favor of fiscal restraint and responsibility, what's
the harm in giving them a shot?
REPRESENTATIVE SKAGGS: Well, the harm in giving them a
shot is, one, whether or not they are, in fact, workable to
accomplish the intended purpose. For example, the balanced
budget amendment being the top of the list that is generally
recited, there has been no provision made in any of the balanced
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budget amendment proposals brought to a vote for its pro-cyclical
problem; that is, it would inherently reinforce the economic cycle
rather than permit fiscal policy to moderate the economic cycle. I
think that is just stupid. But so far, we haven't had anyone clever
enough to figure out how you provide workable exceptions for
real economic circumstances to deal with that in the context of a
balanced budget amendment.
The second problem is much more the one that I was trying to
get at in my remarks; that a compliance mentality trying to solve
all of this by devising additional rules, has clearly shown itself to
be much more likely to induce non-compliance behaviors that
reinforce cynicism, mistrust, and the problem that we have in
getting good people to serve and make mature judgments, than to
solve the problem, and so, I come up short on both good public
policy and good legisprudence in the way I look at these
proposals.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Not that I want to begin a defense of
Rule XXI for the House, but Professor Bloch and Congressman
Skaggs, you both defended your position by saying that it was
somehow counter-majoritarian and that, especially Representative
Skaggs, you invoked the idea that somehow a minority, a vocal
minority representing a very small percentage of the population
could block legislation or things that the public supports
unanimously.
I mean, doesn't that happen everywhere?
In
committees, a couple of Senators can block or, as historian James
Burns said, thwart the political will of a nearly unanimous
public. 9 They already do that now under the House rules. How
are these distinct and different from each other? You called the
supermajority rule a presentment problem. Well, if it doesn't get
out of committee, that's clearly a presentment problem.
REPRESENTATIVE SKAGGS: I think this was more of what
Professor Bloch was addressing than I was, but let me take a shot
at it, as well, in a sort of broader constitutional history context.
The very issue of whether or not there should be supermajorities
dealing with fiscal policy was the reason that we had a
constitutional convention.
The Articles of Confederation
imploded on this very problem. We could not function as a new
M See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS,
MINORrrYPOWER 88-89 (1990).
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nation in requiring supermajorities to deal with the basic
responsibilities of government. I don't think we need to repeat
that mistake.
PROFESSOR BLOCH: I just wanted to say I tried not to make
an argument that the supermajority rule was un-democratic. I
understand, as I think I indicated, that there are many instances
in the Constitution where supermajorities are required and
where, if anything, our Constitution is designed to offer a lot of
occasions for gridlock, and it's a way of protecting our liberty.
My argument against the supermajority rule is simply that it
undermines the carefully constructed structures that the Framers
adopted in how you enact a law, and I think that, for that reason,
it is unconstitutional, but not simply because it doesn't let a
majority win.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'd like to have Congressman Skaggs
take up the response to Mr. Elliott's challenge or analysis of your
position, and that is, you essentially called upon increased moral
virtue, or civic virtue as an answer, among members of Congress,
to the endemic problem of over-spending and over-regulating
and over-taxing, and said that liberals traditionally have rejected
the notion that common everyday citizens have enough moral
virtue or civic understanding to be trusted, without government
supervision or regulation, to do what is right.
So, why is it that that which liberals seem to find so wanting in
the everyday citizen should be relied upon with members of
Congress?
REPRESENTATIVE SKAGGS: Not to try to parse out all of your
propositions, but let me just say that my view of the political
institutions of the country is that, in part, they are designed to
ameliorate and are necessary to ameliorate the unfettered results
of pure individualism and unrestrained markets, and so they are
inherently a way in which we as a people express non-economic
judgments.
To turn that on its head and try to impose on the institution
that is supposed to sort out our non-economic judgments the
same structure that we have seen fail to moderate and modulate
our economic judgments, I think, is contradictory and falls of its
own weight.
MR. GRIFFITH: Professor Elliott, did you have a response to
that?
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PROFESSOR ELLIOTT: Yes. I wanted to respond to that,
because I do disagree with that, but I disagree with it as a
constitutional lawyer.
I think that Professor Bloch has what is for me a persuasive
argument, at least a good argument that, when we are tinkering
with things that are explicitly dealt with in the language of the
Constitution or the design of the Framers, that we have difficulty
doing that constitutionally by ordinary statutes or by rules.
What characterizes the Constitution are its so-called great
silences, and we are allowed-and it was part of the Framers'
design-in those great silences to generate framework statutes
which regulate political interaction at a statutory level. I think
the challenge, if the need for regulation of the political process is
established, is merely the technical but difficult one of coming up
with regulatory structures to regulate the political process that do
not run across explicit constitutional structures, because we
certainly are allowed to regulate politics through statutes where it
does not specifically run across the Framers' design.
MR. GRIFFITH: We have time for one last question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A question for Mr. Elliott.
Sir, you said during your remarks that the real issue is the total
percentage of national wealth to be allocated by government
rather than the private sector. During the last presidential
campaign, at the beginning of one of the debates, I think
President Clinton said that the difference between him and
Senator Dole was that he would raise total federal spending,
within, I think, six years, by 20 percent, whereas Mr. Dole would
raise it by 16 percent, at which point I turned the channel; I can't
tell you what else they said. Isn't the real issue here whether the
federal government is to be restricted to performing its original
delegated powers and whether a judiciary is going to be active
enough to enforce that original allocation?
PROFESSOR ELLIOTT: Well, I would agree with the spirit of
the question but not necessarily the specific remedy that is
suggested.
I noted that, in David McIntosh's statement, he referred to
"spending and regulation" as if the two were a compound noun. I
think that's absolutely correct. Sadly, one of the things that we
learned in the Nixon administration-and I think it was probably
the single most important constitutional decision of the era-is
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that we could use regulation as a substitute for spending (so
called "off budget spending"); we can allocate huge resources in
the private sector without taxing and spending.
So, if you simply look at spending and the deficit, I think
you're missing the overall issue of what percentage of national
income is going to be allocated by the federal government, and
we have to deal with that whole area. But I don't think that using
the judiciary to hold the government to its originally delegated
powers is, in the long run, the solution, 6Dalthough I must say that,
as I get older, I think more seriously about that. So, perhaps, from
the questioner's perspective, there's hope for me yet.
MR. GRIFFITH: Thank you. We want to thank our panel very
much and thank our audience.
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